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JAMES D. COX*
HERBERT S. WANDER**
A toast to the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), and especially its
th
forefathers, on its 60 Birthday! Now at age 60, the MBCA is still vibrant,
meaningful, and it forms the bedrock for the health of the United States
corporate economy.
When we first considered assembling a compilation of articles in Law and
th
Contemporary Problems to celebrate the 60 Anniversary, we had no idea of
the scope, scholarship, depth, and historical importance these articles would
present—a real treasure trove. Moreover, and very importantly, they chart a
course for future deliberations of the Committee on Corporate Laws to address.
A number of themes emerge from these articles. A central theme is that
there is nothing as constant as change. Since 1950, the MBCA has undergone
constant revisions and, in many instances, been the leader or catalyst for
improvement in corporate law.
These articles reflect not only the history of the MBCA and its
achievements, but carefully analyze the relationship of the MBCA with
Delaware Corporate Law and the American Law Institute’s Principles of
Corporate Governance. There are obvious differences in these three, but the
articles demonstrate that these tensions are both healthy and drive each to
strive for greater effectiveness. The contrast between statutory specificity and
judge-made corporate law are also examined and the positive and negative
aspects of each dissected.
The MBCA’s contributions to jurisprudence, appraisal remedies, duty of
disclosure, financial provisions, confidentiality, indemnification, fiduciary duties
of officers and directors, legal capital, and exculpation are chronicled, and
serious recommendations are made on how they can be improved.
The work of the Committee in the area of corporate governance is also
impressive. The various editions of the Corporate Director’s Guidebook,
published by the Committee, have had a substantial and affirmative impact on
the development of corporate governance beginning with its then unheard of
recommendation that non-management directors constitute a majority of the
board of directors of publicly-held corporations. As a number of the articles

Copyright © 2011 by James D. Cox and Herbert S. Wander.
This foreword is also available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp.
* Member, Committee on Corporate Laws, 2006–Present.
** Chair, Committee on Corporate Laws, 2007–2010.

COX & WANDER

ii

1/11/2011

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 74:i

reflect, open issues in the corporate governance arena still exist and they point
the Committee to the continued exploration of, among others, the publicness of
public corporations, the roles of shareholders and directors, and the
communications between boards, management, and shareholders. Now, some
specifics about the articles celebrating sixty years of the MBCA.
Not surprisingly, many of the contributions to this symposium focus on the
orientation drafters should maintain in proposing corporate statutes that will
stand, as the MBCA has, the tests of time. Drawing on insights from
evolutionary economics and game theory, David McBride reflects on the
contributions of corporation law, and particularly the role of statutes such as the
MBCA. He concludes that although legislatures must allow on-going
experimentation with new forms of business organizations, that
experimentation must proceed with a healthy respect that a strong duty of
loyalty is a central pillar to the social success of any corporate entity law. In the
vein of experimentation and adaptation, Lisa Fairfax traces the MBCA’s ability
to nimbly keep pace with the ever-accelerating developments of shareholder
activism—for example, majority vote, shareholder access, and broker voting.
Even though shareholder initiatives are occurring in fairly rapid fire and
dramatically changing the corporate landscape, her review reflects that the
drafters of the MBCA have responded with relative alacrity with provisions that
wisely accommodate the shifting landscape.
Enron and its progeny produced tectonic shifts in the corporate law
landscape. Olson and Briggs examine how the Enron scandal led not only to
responses in the MBCA, but most importantly, to a shift for the MBCA, so that
many of its most recent revisions are not enabling and clarifying, but embrace
important normative standards for directors. These normative standards are
consistent with McBride’s call that the duty of loyalty should continue to be
woven throughout the fabric of corporate law. In doing so, one cannot lose sight
that an over-arching goal of business law is to provide certainty. This should be
a starting point for the drafters of commercial laws such as the MBCA. Mike
Dooley, after providing an insightful contrast of the role of standards versus
rules, closely analyzes the invaluable contributions the MBCA provides by
blending both standards and rules, sometimes in safe harbors, to address
uncertainty while at the same time raising standards of conduct in the corporate
setting.
One of the biggest challenges facing drafters of corporate statutes is the
explosion of different business forms. Bill Clark reviews this explosion of
alternative business entity laws with close attention to the MBCA’s embrace of
cross-entity and share-exchange provisions. He provides a valuable peek into
the future in his description of a “hub-and-spoke” approach to entity
rationalization of the Business Organization Act. Clark opines that this act will
likely influence drafters of alternative entity acts to follow the MBCA’s
approach of increasingly providing default rules to guide the organization and
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operation of unincorporated entities. Again, the themes that pervade this
comment are innovation, flexibility, and enabling.
Adding to the voices celebrating the clarity with which the MBCA speaks is
Bryn Vaaler’s comparative analysis of Delaware’s and the MBCA’s immunity
shields. He carefully traces the uncertainty that surrounded (and to some extent
continues to surround) the scope of section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General
Corporation Law, particularly the slender divide between gross negligence on
the one hand and on the other, conduct not in “good faith,” or a breach of the
“duty of loyalty.” The MBCA steered clear of these ambiguous, albeit historic
expressions. The comment also offers a sobering reminder about the limits of
any comparison between Delaware and the MBCA; because Delaware’s richer
jurisprudence provides a veneer not found in other states, one must be careful
to consider the case law when making such comparisons. This also means that,
since most states lack such a deep case law, more refined and specific
terminology that distinguishes the MBCA should have more appeal to those
states and likely explains why it is the MBCA, and not Delaware, that is copied
by three-fourths the states. This latter point appears in Norm Veasey’s analysis
of the contours of the duty of care as set forth by the MBCA and the American
Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance. He emphasizes that case
law is the “life blood” of the Delaware Corporate law and, as such, is more
flexible and balanced than could be expected from a corporate statute.
Delaware’s statute is the obvious source to compare to the MBCA.
Within the realm of corporate law, the Delaware General Corporation Law
and the MBCA are without peers. Even though there continues to be a lively
debate regarding the competition for corporate charters, Gorris, Hamermesh,
and Strine’s close analysis of several reform efforts supports the view that
symbiosis, not competition, best characterizes the relationship of these two acts.
They offer praise for each body’s drafters—Delaware’s drafters for their
innovation and the MBCA’s drafters for their refinements.
Many of the contributors to this symposium stress the benefits of the
deliberative process that surrounds the work of the Committee on Corporate
Laws in keeping the MBCA abreast with the rapid developments that pervade
corporate practice. Larry Scriggins documents the enduring benefits of the
Committee’s procedures by closely examining the multiple steps the Committee
pursued in casting aside the former surplus/impairment of capital regime for
regulating distributions and embracing a radically different regime that, as he
points out, has not only been widely adopted, but has needed only minor
tinkering with the language initially introduced in1980.
The Committee on Corporate Laws has made innumerable contributions
aside from the MBCA. Marshall Small provides an important historical note by
tracing the forces and the leadership of several former committee members in
producing one of the most significant mediums shaping director behavior, the
Corporate Director’s Guidebook. Like many forces, the Corporate Director’s
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Guidebook arose from the troubling reports of weak governance in public
companies that poured forth post-Watergate. Congress acted by passing the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and the ABA acted more deliberately through
years of effort to identify and then implement a medium to improve director
oversight. That medium was the publication in 1978 of the Corporate Director’s
Guidebook (which is about to enter its sixth edition).
Hillary Sale reminds us that there is more to the meaning of being a public
corporation than having ownership broadly held and, hence, the forces that
govern such corporations are broader than their ownership base. We might add
here that some institutions, namely financial institutions, are so interwoven with
each other and with the national economy that their governance, as we have
seen, is a matter of national interest. But even outside the large financial
institutions, consumers, government, labor, and other organized bodies
increasingly focus public attention on the behavior of the large corporation.
This in turn, as she points out, provides an additional hand on the corporate
governance tiller and is a force that will continue to be reckoned with in future
drafting efforts of the MBCA and equally so for the Corporate Director’s
Guidebook. Indeed, governance is moving faster than other areas within the
purview of the modern corporate statute. On this point, John Wilcox provides
an interesting approach for directors to better respond to the publicness of their
oversight of a public company. He sets forth a self-operating approach whereby
directors will not just undertake certain steps to carry out their oversight
functions, but will do so in a very public way. In essence, it would not be
sufficient to merely meet standards for independence and carrying out the
corporate interests—the directors collectively will be expected to explain
annually just how they assured their independence and how they believed they
acted to advance the corporation’s interests. The contributions of Hillary Sale
and John Wilcox underscore the web of social forces that surround the
governance of the American corporation.
The symposium benefits from valuable contributions focused on specific
issues covered by the corporate statutes. With business organizations becoming
increasingly complex, the necessity of directors and officers to rely on others
has risen exponentially. Such reliance, however, comes with risks when that
reliance is misplaced. Balotti and Shaner closely study the divergent approaches
the Delaware General Corporation Law and MBCA take in their “reliance safe
harbors.” In their analysis, they raise an important policy issue of whether
officers, like directors, should enjoy a reliance safe harbor. Deborah DeMott
provides a close review of several recent judicial decisions interpreting the right
of “agents” to obtain indemnification or advancement of expenses. She
concludes there is a serious misfit of the concept of agent in the indemnification
context, so that outcomes in these cases have not been well served by attempts
to apply common-law agency doctrines within the indemnification-corporate
context.

COX & WANDER

Winter 2011]

1/11/2011

FOREWORD

v

Directors and officers face serious disclosure issues when undertaking
corporate transactions, particularly those involving public companies, and even
more so with transactions conditioned on stockholder approval. Stan Keller’s
article provides a close analysis of the rapidly-developing Delaware case law
surrounding state-based disclosure obligations. Even though articles elsewhere
in this issue praise the certainty provided by the MBCA in other regulated
areas, Stan Keller offers a compelling thesis that in the disclosure area, statutes
are better to provide baseline requirements, leaving it to the case law to provide
textured responses to highly fact-based disputes on whether additional
disclosure is required.
A central feature of being a fiduciary is the duty of confidentiality; even
though confidentiality underlies the well-received view of what it means to be a
fiduciary, this dimension of the fiduciary obligations of directors heretofore has
been largely unexplored. Cyril Moscow provides a much needed analysis of the
sources of the obligation of confidentiality and the demands it makes on the
director. In doing so, he explores the difficulties to be encountered when one
serves dual-competing directorships or as a director for an identified
constituency.
Jim Hanks’s contributions are multiple. He shines a much needed light on
the circuit split regarding whether cash payments to the target company’s
stockholders following an acquisition are to be viewed as a disguised
“distribution” subject and regulated by the distribution provision in section 6.40
of the MBCA. Hanks also provides a compelling case that the balance sheet test
for lawful dividends that is embraced by the MBCA in many contexts adds
little. To this end, while critical of the reasoning in Lerner v. Lerner Corp.,1
where the court appears to have confused its application of the solvency and
balance sheet tests, overall he makes the case that the solvency test, alone, has
much to commend itself to drafters of corporate statutes. Finally, Hanks
provides a warm, endearing description of one of the giants of corporate law,
Dean Bayless Manning.
Two of the comments in this symposium focus on the appraisal remedy and
provide a close comparative study of the appraisal remedy in the MBCA and
the Delaware General Corporation Law, but more importantly, identify why
they each believe the MBCA’s approach embraces sounder public policy. Mary
Siegel compares the Delaware and the MBCA appraisal remedies in four
distinct categories: transactions giving rise to the remedy, timing of the
corporation’s payment pursuant to the remedy, the allocation of costs of the
proceeding, and the market-out exception. Bob Thompson, focusing
particularly on the changes introduced to the MBCA in 1999, celebrates the
clarity of purpose, certainty, and policy choices now embodied in the MBCA’s
appraisal remedy. In doing so, he nonetheless questions some important

1. Lerner v. Lerner Corp., 711 A.2d 233 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998).
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features of both the MBCA and the Delaware provision, particularly the
wisdom of removing the surviving company’s shareholders from the scope of
the appraisal statute.
As we approach the seventh decade of the MBCA, and as one of the articles
recommends, the Committee must be mindful of its obligation to provide sound
corporate law for non-public corporations and examine the relationship of the
MBCA to other entities’ laws.
Finally, we wish to thank each of the authors for their valuable contributions
and the excellent editorial work provided by the staff of Law and
Contemporary Problems. In closing, it has been a real privilege for one of us,
Herb, to serve as Chair, and the other, Jim, to be among the members, of this
unique Committee dedicated to improving corporate law in America.

